This paper introduces a new interaction index among players of a cooperative game or criteria in a decision making problem: the chaining interaction whose definition is based on the maximal chains of the lattice related to the set of coalitions. This interaction index as well as the Shapley and Banzhaf interaction indices belong to the class of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices. Conversion formulas between some representations are pointed out. Moreover, links with multilinear extensions and potentials are also investigated.
Introduction
Let v N be a cooperative game on the finite set of players N that is a set function v called capacity from 2 N to IR such that v(∅) = 0. For each coalition S ⊆ N of players, the real number v(S) represents the worth or the power of S.
Since the work of Shapley [13] the concept of value of a game has been widely used in cooperative game theory. Taking the Shapley value related to i, φ v (i), as a typical example, the fact that in general this value is different from v(i) shows that the players interact. Players i and j have interest to cooperate when the worth of coalition {i, j} is more than the sum of individual worths. Players i and j have no interest to cooperate when the worth of {i, j} is less than the sum of individual worths. Players i and j can act independently in case of equality.
The interaction between players i and j can be considered as the average of the marginal contributions of j in the presence of i minus the average of the marginal contributions of j in the absence of i which corresponds to the weighted sum over all coalitions T ⊆ N \ {i, j}
of [v(T ∪ {i, j}) − v(T ∪ {i})] − [v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T )] = δ {i,j} v(T ∪ {i, j})
that is, with t = |T |, n = |N |, The interaction between s members of a coalition S is obtained as a natural extension of the case s = |S| = 2:
This family of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices has been introduced recently by Grabisch and Roubens [7] and contains:
For one-membered coalitions, we get the Shapley value [13] :
The Shapley interaction between a pair of players {i, j} was already defined in 1993 by Murofushi and Soneda [10] . Borrowing concepts from multiattribute utility theory, they proposed to define the interaction index of elements i, j ∈ N by
. They interpreted such an expression as a kind of average value of the added value given by putting i and j together, all coalitions being considered.
• the interactionà la
For one-membered coalitions, we get the Banzhaf value [2] :
In multicriteria decision making, when N represents a set of criteria, v is a weight function and the real number v(S) represents the weight related to the combination S of criteria. Typically, such a weight function is a fuzzy measure on N , that is a monotonic set function v : 2
In this context, the parallelism between game theory and multicriteria decision making is clear. The overall importance of a criterion i ∈ N is not solely determined by the number v(i), but also by all v(T ) such that i ∈ T . Thus, a coefficient of importance can be represented by a power index, which could be given for example by the Shapley value.
Considering a pair of criteria {i, j} ⊆ N , we easily see that the difference
seems to reflect the degree of interaction between i and j. This difference is positive if there is a synergy effect between i and j. These two criteria then interfere in a positive way. The difference is negative in case of overlap effect between i and j. The criteria then interfere in a negative way. Finally, the difference is zero when the individual importances v({i}) and v({j}) are adding without interfering. In this case, there is no interaction between i and j.
As for importance, a proper definition of interaction should consider not only v({i}), v({j}), v({i, j}) but also the measures of all subsets containing i and j. Thus the interaction between criteria i an j, and more generally, among a combination S of criteria can be represented by a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a third interaction index belonging to the family of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices: the chaining interaction index I v R , for which one has
We can already notice that
can be considered as an extension of the Shapley value to determine the interaction between the players of the coalition S ⊆ N .
The chaining interaction index
Let us consider the lattice L(N ) related to the power set of N . We can represent L(N ) as a graph called Hasse Diagram H(N ) whose nodes correspond to the coalitions S ⊆ N and the edges represent adding a player to the bottom coalition to get the top coalition. A maximal chain of H(N ) is an ordered collection of n + 1 nested distinct coalitions
The set of maximal chains of H(N ) is denoted C(N ). Let M be an element of C(N ) and M S the minimal coalition belonging to M that contains S. The cardinality of C(N ) is equal to n! and we define
The value I v R (i) corresponds to the Shapley value related to i as it was mentioned by Edelman [4] dealing with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowable.
We now prove that I v R is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction for which p s t (n) is defined by (1) .
If C
S,S∪T
represents the subclass included in C(N ) of maximal chains that have {S ∪ T } as minimal coalition including S, we have
For example, if N = {1, 2, 3}, we have
It is easy to observe that C
corresponds to a disjoint union of sets of maximal chains defined in sublattices of L(N ). In particular, we can see that
We then have, for all s = 1, . . . , n and all t = 0, . . . , n − s,
The chaining interaction index I v R is of cardinal-probabilistic type since, if S = ∅,
Equivalent representations
Any game v N has a canonical representation in terms of unanimity games that determine a linear basis for v.
If {v T } T ⊆N is such that v T (S) = 1 for S ⊇ T and 0 otherwise then
and the real coefficients {a(T )} T ⊆N are called the dividends of the coalitions in game v. In combinatorics, a viewed as a set function on N is called the Möbius transform of v. The interaction indices I Sh and I B can be expressed from this set function as follows (see [6] ):
The set function a is a representation of v since there is a bijection between the set of games and the set of dividends, i.e. defining one of the two allows to compute the other without ambiguity. More formally, a set function w : 2 
(w).
It has been proved in [6] 
On the one hand, we have (see [6] )
When p s t (n) is given by (1), the previous identity becomes
which proves (3). On the other hand, we have, by (3),
which proves (4). It is interesting to note how formula (3) The conversion formulas between I R and v can be given as follows:
we obtain, by setting T := T ∪ L (which implies L = T ∩ S and T = T \ S):
which proves (5) . On the other hand, we have, by (2) and (4),
where the second sum ( * ) equals (−1)
k+1
if |K ∩ S| = 1 and 0 otherwise. Therefore
which proves (6) .
The conversion formulas between I R and I Sh can also be given. We have
with
where {B n } n∈IN is the sequence of Bernoulli numbers
and B n (x) is the nth Bernoulli polynomial defined by Let us prove (7) . It has been established in [6] that
Therefore, by (3),
Let us prove (8) . It has been established in [6] that
Therefore, by (4),
and
Hence the result. Using similar arguments, we can also prove that
indeed, we simply have
Links with multilinear extensions and potentials
The multilinear extension of v (MLE) is a multilinear polynomial defined by (see e.g. [11] ) 
and we obtain that [6]
We thus see that the Banzhaf interaction index related to S is the value of the Sderivative of the MLE of game v on the center of the hypercube [0, 1] n , while the Shapley interaction index related to S is obtained by integrating the S-derivative of the MLE of game v along the main diagonal of the hypercube.
There is also a close link between ∆ S g and I R . We can easily prove that
indeed, it has been proved in [6] that
and hence we have and hence we can conclude by (9) . It is worth noting that formula (7) can be retrieved by using the same argument; indeed, it has been shown in [6] 
